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CASENOTES
In Florida it is said that the causes which create the necessity must
fall under one of three distinct categories. 4 Generally, as to the problem
of what constitutes an extreme and absolute necessity, there is no acceptable
categorical answer, as indicated.'- 5 It may be determined by the discretion
of the trial judge, and may range from what the judge thinks are prejudicial
remarks on the part of the defendant's attorney,' 6 to a dismissal of a jury
which could not agree after long deliberation. 7 In considering this aspect
of what is an absolute necessity, we should be careful not to become
over-zealous in our protection of the rights of the accused,' 8 but we should
equally bear in mind the protection of the public represented by the
state. In the absence of any concrete principle, it appears that jeopardy
will attach unless there arises some reason why the court cannot function. '
JAMEs L. LINuS
DIVORCE-DIRECT AND COLLATERAL ATTACK-SUIT
BY STRANGERS
Strangers to a divorce decree sought to attack it directly by a bill in
the nature of a bill of review on the ground that the decree was obtained
by fraud. Except for such divorce decree, appellants would be the sole
heirs of the deceased. Held, such an attack may be made by a stranger
to a decree when his interests are substantially affected thereby, but the
decree will be set aside only insofar as his interests are concerned. Jones
v. Goolsby, 68 So.2d 89 (Miss. 1953).
Subject to certain limitations, a court having jurisdiction of divorce
cases may, for good cause shown and upon due proceedings, seasonably
set aside or modify its own judgments or decrees of divorce on its own
motion or on the application of one of the parties.' Whether a particular
decree should or should not be opened, 2 modified,' or annulled, 4 rests
largely within the discretion of the court."
14. State ex rel. Alcala v. Grayson, 156 Fla. 435, 436, 23 So.2d 484, 485 (1945)
(The causes which create the necessity must fall under one of three heads, namely:
"(1) where the court is compelled by law to be adjourned before the jury can agree
upon a verdict; (2) where the prisoner by his own misconduct places it out of the
power of the jury to investigate his case correctly, thereby obtaining an unfair advantage
of the state, or is himself . . . prevented from being able to attend to his trial;(3) where there is no possibility for the jury to agree upon and return a verdict.").
15. See note 7 supra.
16. Mack v. Comm., 177 Va. 921, 15 S.E.2d 78 (1941).
17. Smith v. State, 135 Fla. 835, 186 So. 203 (1939).
18. Kepner v. U.S., 195 U.S. 100, 136 (1904).
19. State ex rel. Alcala v. Grayson, sujra note 14.
1. Ex parte Favors, 225 Ala. 675, 145 So. 146 (1932); Brook v. Baker, 208
Ark. 654, 187 S.W.2d 169 (1945); Reimers v. McEIree, 238 Iowa 791, 28 N.W.2d
569 (1947).
2. Mitchell v. Mitchell, 97 N.J.Eq. 298. 127 Atl. 185 (Ct. Err. & App. 1925),
reversing, 96 N.J.Eq. 29, 125 Atl. 490 (Ch. 1924).
3. Kunker v. Kunker, 230 App. Div. 641, 246 N.YSupp. 118 (3d Dep't 1930).
4. Walker v. Walker, 198 Wash. 150, 87 P.2d 479 (1939).
5. Keller v. Keller, 139 Ind. 38, 38 NE. 337 (1894).
MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
It is well established by the decisions and the text-writers" that when
relief is sought against a decree which has been obtained by fraud, the
same may be granted under the following circumstances:
(1) Any party to a decree that has been obtained by fraud may attack
it by motion, petition or bill of review, and may have the decree vacated
and set aside for all purposes.7
(2) One who is not a party to the decree, but a stranger thereto,
may not, in a collateral proceeding, attack a decree that is valid on its face,
even though it has been obtained by fraud, nor may he maintain an ordinary
bill of review. Such a stranger's exclusive right and remedy is to attack
the fraudulent decree by a bill in the nature of a bill of review.8
At the outset it is necessary to distinguish between a "direct" and a
"collateral" attack on a decree. If an action or proceeding is brought for
the purpose of impeaching or overturning the decree, it is a "direct" attack
upon it;" but if the action or proceeding has an independent purpose and
contemplates some other relief or result, although the overturning of the
decree may be important or even necessary to its success, then the attack
is "collateral."' 0
Ordinarily, the right to have an invalid divorce decree set aside existed
only in favor of the injured spouse,' t and does not exist in a person who
is a stranger to the suit.' 2 This ancient rule is now relaxed, and those
who were not parties but who may be affected by decrees, may file such a
bill. They are then properly termed supplemental bills in the nature of
bills of review.' 3 Bills of review are still confined to parties to the original
cause, whereas a bill having the same general purpose but filed by or against
a stranger to the decree is considered as a bill in the nature of a bill of
6. STORY'S EQUITY PLEADINGS § 424 (9th ed. 1879).
7. GRFrITH'S CHANCERY PRACTICE § 644, p. 708 (2d ed. 1872).
8. Kirby v. Kent, 172 Miss. 457, 160 So. 569 (1935); Sykes v. Sykes, 162 Miss.
487, 139 So. 853 (1932).
9. Hall v. fluff, 122 Ark. 67, 182 S.W. 535 (1916); Howard v. Howard, 27
Cal.2d 319, 163 P.2d 439 (1945); Bowers v. Brazell, 27 N.M. 685, 205 Pac. 715 (1922);
Bragdon v. Wright, 142 S.W.2d 703 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940).
10. Lieber v. Lieber, 239 Mo. 1, 143 S.W. 458 (1911); Lough v. Taylor, 97 W. Va.
180, 124 S.E. 585 (1924).
11, In re Newman, 75 Cal. 213, 16 Pac. 887 (1888)(in which the court held
that the party aggrieved by a divorce decree is the only party who can attack it in
any way, thereby holding that a third person seeking letters of administration on the
estate of an adopting father could not attack the validity of the divorce of the adopted
child's mother); Tyler v. Aspinwall, 73 Conn. 493, 47 At. 755 (1932); Sykes v.
Sykes, 162 Miss. 487, 139 So. 853 (1932).
12. Schuster v. Schuster, 51 Ariz. I, 73 P.2d 1345 (1937); Long v. Stratton,
50 Ariz. 427, P.2d 939 (1937); Thomas v. Lambert, 187 Ga. 616, 1 S.E.2d 443 (1939);
Waldo v. Waldo, 52 Mich. 94, 17 N.W. 710 (1883). Contra: Rawlins v. Rawlins,
18 Fla. 345 (1881) (child born after divorce decree was granted is a proper party
plaintiff to have it set aside).
13. Wynn v. First National Bank of Dothan, 229 Ala. 639, 159 So. 58 (1934);
Cunningham v. Ward, 224 Ala. 288, 140 So. 351 (1932): Golden Gate Development
Co. v. Ritchie, 140 Fla. 103, 191 So. 202 (1939); People v. Sterling, 357 Ill. 354,
192 N.E. 229 (1934); Singleton v. Singleton, 47 Ky. 340 at 344 (1843).
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review, 14 and may be brought without leave of court.15 In those jurisdictions
where the rule has been relaxed, it has been held that relief can be granted
on application of a parent'8 or child 7 of one of the parties.' 8 The more
generally accepted rule is that an exception exists for the purpose of
establishing property rights'9 or to purge the court records of decrees which
it had wrongfully been misled into making.20 In these cases of affected
interests, a stranger who had no standing to appeal from the rendition
of the decree, is allowed to attack the decree collaterally for fraud.21
The courts do not agree as to when or under what circumstances
and conditions a decree adversely affects the rights of a stranger to the
decree so as to enable him to attack it. They do not agree as to whether
the right or interest adversely affected must have accrued prior to the time
when the decree was rendered,22 or whether it is sufficient that such interest
accrued thereafter, but prior to the institution of the suit in which the
validity of the divorce decree is impeached. 23 While some jurisdictions
hold that the right must have existed prior to rendition of the decree,24
others hold that it does not depend upon injury at the time of its entry,
but prevails where interests are subsequently adversely affected by the
decree. 25  Still other jurisdictions hold that the proceeding is maintainable
only in the county where the divorce was granted;26 others hold that it
14. United States v. Kunz, 5 F.R.D. 391 (S.D.N.Y. 1946); Andrew v. Heckler,
132 Fla. 759, 182 So. 251 (1938); Thomas v. Lambert, 187 Ga. 616, 1 S.E.2d 443(1939); Columbia Casualty Co. v. Mitchell, 329 Ill. App. 325, 68 N.E.2d 208 (1946).
15. Miller v. Miller, 234 Ala. 453, 175 So, 284 (1937); Nation v. Nation, 206
Ala. 397, 90 So. 494 (1921); Koberlein v. First National Bank of St. Elmo, 376 Ill. 450,
34 N.E.2d 388 (1941); STORY'S EQUITY PLEADINGS, § 426 p. 400.
16. Phillips v. Phillips, 6 Pa. D. & C. 81 (1925).
17. Mintz v. Mintz, 83 Pa. Super. 85 (1924).
18. Lipham v. State, 62 Ga. App. 174, 22 S.E.2d 532 (19421(Florida decree
subject to attack by state of Georgia); Adams v. Adams, 152 Mass. 290, 28 N.E. 260(1891); Deyette v. Deyette, 92 Vt. 305, 104 Aft. 232 (1918).
19. McGuiness v. Superior Court of San Francisco, 196 Cal. 2220, 237 Pac. 42(1925); Russell v. Russell, 129 Fla. 866, 177 So. 280 (1937); Richardson v. King,
157 Iowa 287, 135 N.W. 640 (1912); In re Lindgren's Estate, 293 N.Y. 18, 55 N.E.2d
849 (1944) (regardless of validity of decree between parties thereto, minor child could
challenge validity of Florida divorce decree). But see, Baugh v. Baugh, 38 Mich. 59,
26 Am. Rep. 495 (1877).
20. Cohn v. Stanford, 131 Cal. App, 463, 21 P.2d 464 (1933); In re Newman,
75 Cal. 213, 16 Pac. 887 (1888); Smith v. Smith, 173 Ga. 718, 161 S.E. 254 (1931);
In re Goldberg's Estate, 288 Ill. App. 203, 5 N.E.2d 863 (1937), cert. denied, 303
U.S. 693 (1937); Kirby v. Kent, 172 Miss. 457, 160 So. 569 (1935) (holding that
perjury is not ground for a collateral attack); Owens v. Owens, 32 N.M. 445, 259
Pac. 822 (1927).
21. Pinkston v. Schuman, 210 Ark. 896, 198 S.W.2d 66 (1946); Senor v. Senor,
272 App. Div. 306, 70 N.Y.S.2d 909 (1st Dep't 1947), aff'd, 297 N.Y. 800, 78 N.E.2d
20 (1948); Conklin v. Conklin, 179 Misc. 766, 39 N.Y.S.2d 825 (Sup. Ct. 1943);
Lough v. Taylor, 97 W.Va. 180, 124 S.E. 585 (1924); 1 FREEMAN, JUDGEMENTS
636 (5th ed. 1925).
22. Kirby v. Kent, 172 Miss. 457, 160 So. 569 (1935).
23. deMarigny v. deMarigny, 43 So.2d 442 (Fla. 1949).
24. See note 22 supra.
25. Old Colony Trust Co. v. Porter, 324 Mass. 581, 88 N.E.2d 135 (1949).
26. Michael v. Post, 21 Wall. 398 (U.S. 1874); State ex rel. Willys v. Chilling-
worth, 124 Fla. 288, 168 So. 249 (1936).
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may be attacked outside the jurisdiction of its rendition.27 The jurisdictions
split as to whether the alleged defect must appear on the face of the
record;28 some allow extrinsic evidence to be introduced.29  The majority
of jurisdictions hold that the decree may be set aside after the death
of one of the parties.30 Two states have held otherwise; that an action
for divorce is purely personal, and that upon the death of either party
the subject matter of the action is eliminated and the decree cannot be
thereafter set aside. 1
There is authority that holds that distribution of property is merely
incidental to and is not sufficient interest to allow for a collateral attack
upon a divorce decree.; -2
In the principal case, the court had no precedent decision of its own
courts to follow. The nearest similar case 3  involved a collateral attack
and so was distinguishable. So the court followed the law as set out
in a Massachusetts8 4 and in a Florida case8 5 wherein it was held that a
stranger to a fraudulent decree may attack the same and have it set
aside. However, the procedure followed must be a direct attack and by
a bill in the nature of a bill of review. Also that the stranger can only
seek to have the decree so restrained as to be inoperative with respect
to his own interests only,36 and even then he cannot have the decree vacated
if another remedy is available to meet his needs without disturbing the
status apparently established by the decree. 37 Also that it is immaterial
27. Adams v. Adams, 154 Mass. 290, 28 N.E. 260 (1891).
28. Rich v. Mentz Township, 134 U.S. 632 (1890); in re McNeil's Estate, 155
Cal. 333, 100 Pac. 1086 (1909); Crossman v. Vivienda Water Co., 150 Cal. 575,
89 Pac. 335 (1907); accord, State ex rel. Friedrich v. Howell, 156 Fla. 163, 23 So.2d
153 (1945); Ennis v. Giblin, 147 Fla. 113, 2 So,2d 382 (1941); Fiche v. R. E. House-
holder Co., 98 Fla. 627, 125 So. 2 (1929); Lucy v. Deas, 59 Fla. 552, 52 So. 515
(1910); Salt Lake City v. Industrial Comm'n, 82 Utah 179, 22 P.2d 1046 (1933).
29. Crouch v. 1-. L. Miller & Co., 169 Cal. 341, 146 Pac. 880 (1915); Sache v.
Gillette, 101 Minn. 169, 112 N.W. 386 (1907); Ferguson v. Crawford, 70 N.Y. 253,
26 Am. Rep. 589 (1877).
30. Savage v. Olson, 9 So.2d 363 (Fla. 1942); Baugh v. Baugh, 38 Mich. 59,
26 Am. Rep. 495 (1877). See, Urquhart v. Urquhart, 272 App. Div. 60, 69 N.Y.S.2d 57
(1st Dep't 1947) (conclusion justified on ground that states interest in preserving the
legitimacy of a child was a circumstance paramount to other considerations); Fowler
v. Fowler, 190 N.C. 536, 130 S.E. 315 (1925).
31. Richardson v. King, 157 Iowa 287, 135 N.W. 640 (1912); Ruger v. Heckel,
85 N.Y, 483 (1881); Lloyd v. Lloyd, 40 Pa. Co. 595 (1912); Stuart v. Cole, 42 Tex.
Civ. App. 478, 92 S.W. 1040 (1906); Bater v. Bater, 5 B.R.C. 717. 4 Ann. Cases
854 (1906). But see, Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
32. Ford v. Ford, 218 Ala. 15, 117 So. 462 (1928); Tyler v. Aspinwall, 73 Conn.
493, 47 AtI. 755 (1932); Lieber v. Lieber, 239 Mo. 1, 143 S.W. 458 (1911); Dwyer
v, Nolan, 40 Wash. 459, 82 Pac. 746 (1905).
33. Kirby v. Kent, 172 Miss. 457, 160 So. 569 (1935); Sykes v. Sykes, 162 Miss.
487, 139 So. 853 (1932).
34. Old Colony Trust Co. v. Porter, 324 Mass. 581. 88 N.E.2d 135 (1949).
35. Michael v. Post, 21 Wall. 398 (U.S. 1874); State ex rel. Wi"lys v. Chilling-
worth, 124 Fla. 288, 168 So. 249 (1936).
36. Old Colony Trust Co. v. Porter, 324 Mass. 581, 88 N.E.2d 135 (1949).
But see Tucker v. Fisk, 154 Mass. 574 at 576, 577, 28 N.E. 1051 (1891); Jones v.
Davenport, 46 NJ.Eq. 237, 19 Atl. 22 (Ct. Err. & App. 1890).
37. Old Colony Trust Co. v. Porter, 324 Mass. 581, 88 N.E.2d 135 (1949).
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whether his right existed, either before, at the time of, or after rendition
of the decree. The reason such attack is permitted is not because interested
persons were injured in any property rights at the time the decree was
rendered; it is simply because, if the decree is void, they are not bound
by it and someone is attempting to use it against their present interests.3,
There is a vast difference between the available remedies against
invalid decrees, depending upon who the parties are that desire to attack
the decree. The mode of procedure in such cases and circumstances under
which the exercise of such power can be invoked successfully, varies in
the different jurisdictions. For these reasons the decisions in one state
afford but little aid in determining matters of this kind in another
jurisdiction.
Since in a great majority of divorces neither party wishes to disturb
the decree, if their acquiescence should be allowed to have the effect
supposed, third persons may be affected in their property and in their
sacred personal rights without ever having had an opportunity to be heard.
Therefore, although "all the world is not a party to a divorce proceeding,"3 9
those whose interests may be affected thereby should be allowed their day
in court.
MEYER M. BRILLIANT
EQUITY-MASTERS--OBJECTION TO REFERENCE
Over objection, a chancellor ordered a reference to a master to
report findings of fact and conclusions relative to applicable law. On
petition for writ of certiorari to quash the reference, held, the chancellor
was in effect delegating the decision of the case to the master, and this
could not be done over the objection of a party. Slatcoff v. Dezen, 74 So.2d
59 (Fla. 1954).
A reference to a master is an equity proceeding which has for its
purpose the determination of disputed issues.' An order of reference may
be made at any stage of a suit, 2 and all persons in interest are entitled
to attend and be notified thereof. 3  A master is an assistant of the
chancellor;4 his function is the performance of acts, either judicial or
ministerial in nature, which the chancellor, in accordance with equity
practice, may require of him." Reference is to be distinguished from
arbitration in that the latter allows the substitution of a decision by an
38. Ibid.
39. Williams v. State of North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 at 231 (1945).
1. 19 AM. JUR., Equity § 364 (1952); 23 R. C. L. 284 (1929).
2. Field v. Holland, 6 Crunch 8 (U.S. 1810); accord, Pepper v. Addicks, 153
Fed. 383 (E.D. Pa. 1907); Briggs v. Neal, 120 Fed. 224 (4th Cir. 1903).
3. Williams v. Morgan, 111 U.S. 684 (1884); Eslava v. Lepretre, 21 Ala. 504,
56 Am. Dec. 266 (1852).
4. Richardson v. Frazier, 247 Litt. (Ky.) 59, 56 S.W.2d 708 (1933).
5. Schuchardt v. People, 99 I11. 501, 39 Am. Rep. 34 (1881).
